Exhibits May 22, 2013 (2024)

Case

JUAN BORIS MUNOZ VS JOSE SANTIAGO

Jul 19, 2024 |SD 03 - South Dade 03 - Judge De La Rosa, Lissette |Evictions - Residential |Evictions - Residential |2024-139760-CC-26

Case

Riviera TFL LLC vs Godfrey, Nyesha

Jul 19, 2024 |Black, Melissa. C |Civil |LT Residential Eviction- Possession Only |24-CC-040626

Case

ALYA GRENELEFE LLC vs. PEREZ, CEZILIA

Jul 23, 2024 |M8 STACIE L KAYLOR |EVIC - EVICTION (RESIDENTIAL) |2024CC005990000000

Case

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY vs. AMOS, MICHAEL Jet al.

Jul 26, 2024 |Margaret H. Schreiber |CA - Homestead Residential Foreclosure up to $50,000 |CA - Homestead Residential Foreclosure up to $50,000 |2024-CA-006673-O

Case

COLUMBIA MIRADOR LLC VS EMBER VILLEGAS ET AL

Jul 19, 2024 |CC 04 - Downtown Miami 04 - Judge Gonzalez-Whyte, Diana |Evictions - Residential |Evictions - Residential |2024-140361-CC-05

Case

RAM MIAMI RIVER SOUTH, LLC VS CARLOS PEREZ

Jul 22, 2024 |CC 08 - Downtown Miami 08 - Judge Ortiz, Maria D |Evictions - Residential |Evictions - Residential |2024-141855-CC-05

Case

NHC-FL116, LLC vs LINDLER, JOHN

Jul 22, 2024 |Black, Melissa. C |Civil |LT Residential Eviction/Past Due Rent $0.00-$15,000.00 |24-CC-040907

Case

COHN, DONALD EDWARD V FITZGIBBON, BARBARA

Jul 17, 2024 |Reid P. Scott, II |EJECTMENT |50-2024-CA-006929-XXXA-MB

Case

EDMONDS, ECCLESIASTES vs WEBB, AALIYAH

Jul 18, 2024 |Martin, Richard. H |Civil |LT Unlawful Detainer |24-CC-040398

Ruling

HAUT vs BUSH

Jul 24, 2024 |CVRI2401221

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATIONCVRI2401221 HAUT VS BUSHBY KEVIN BUSH, SEABOARD INC.Tentative Ruling: Grant motion to compel arbitration and stay action as to these Defendantspending completion of arbitration.

Ruling

AGAPITO VS. NACELLI

Jul 19, 2024 |MSC22-00125

MSC22-00125CASE NAME: AGAPITO VS. NACELLI*HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENSFILED BY:*TENTATIVE RULING:*Before the Court is Defendant Tina Paclebar’s Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens.Factual BackgroundPlaintiffs allege that they met with Defendant Joseph Nacelli in July 2009 to discuss their desire topurchase real property located at 761 Mariposa Ave. in Rodeo, California (“Property”). As Plaintiffsdid not qualify for a mortgage, they wanted to have Defendant Nacelli hold title to the Property intrust for them. At that time, Mr. Nacelli was living rent-free with Plaintiffs. In return, Plaintiffs agreedthey would make the down payment for the Property and pay all costs related to the Property,including property taxes, insurance, and maintenance and repair costs. Defendant Nacelli agreed tothese terms.On July 1, 2009, title to the Property was transferred to Mr. Nacelli, per the terms of the aboveagreement. Plaintiffs used Josephine Agapito’s sister, Elizabeth Monsanto, as their real estate agent.Plaintiffs, not Mr. Nacelli, paid into escrow the down payment for the Property. Since that time, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024Plaintiffs have paid the mortgage, paid for all upkeep of the Property, and have rented the Propertyto family members of Plaintiff Arnel Agapito.Mr. Nacelli never moved into the Property, but instead continued to live rent-free with Plaintiffs until2017 when he voluntarily moved out. Mr. Nacelli admits he never paid any expenses related to theProperty, nor had anything to do with maintaining the Property. However, in December 2021, Mr.Nacelli sold the Property to Defendant Tina Paclebar – without consulting with or informing Plaintiffs.Defendant Paclebar is the long-term domestic partner of Defendant Jane Nacelli – who is PlaintiffJosephine Agapito’s (and Defendant Joseph Nacelli’s) sister. Ms. Paclebar has been considered ‘partof the family’ to the Agapito’s for over 15 years. She has been invited to family holidays and events.The Property was never put up for sale to the general public. Instead, the Property was sold to Ms.Paclebar for $365,000. The closing statement for the sale, however, indicates that Mr. Nacelli ‘gifted’$154,163.43 of that amount to Ms. Paclebar.Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on January 24, 2022. They allege a number of causes of actionagainst Mr. Nacelli, including fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. They also allege causes of actionaimed at nullifying the sale of the Property, including quiet title, constructive trust, and fraudulentconveyance. Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Paclebar knew, or should have known, that Mr. Nacelli was notthe rightful owner of the Property, and was not authorized to sell it. Ms. Paclebar contends she is abona fide purchaser of value for the Property, and had no knowledge of the alleged agreementbetween Plaintiffs and Mr. Nacelli.Legal Standard“[A] lis pendens is recorded by someone asserting a real property claim, to give notice that a lawsuithas been filed which may, if that person prevails, affect title to or possession of the real propertydescribed in the notice.” (Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Charlton (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1069,citing CCP §§ 405.2, 405.4, 405.20.) Under Code Civ. Proc. § 405.30, at any time after a notice ofpendency of action has been recorded, any party with an interest in the real property may apply tothe Court to expunge the notice.“The expungement statutes provide that a lis pendens may be expunged on three grounds: (1) ‘thepleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real property claim’ (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 405.31); (2) ‘the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probablevalidity of the real property claim’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32); or (3) ‘adequate relief can be secured tothe claimant by the giving of an undertaking’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.33).” (Carr v. Rosien (2015) 238Cal.App.4th 845, 857.) Probable validity is met when the Plaintiff establishes her claim by apreponderance of the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32.)The party prevailing on an expungement motion must be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costsincurred in making or opposing the motion unless the court finds the other party acted with“substantial justification” or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of attorney fees and costs“unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.38.) SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024Overview of Issues and Arguments Real Property ClaimInitially, it is uncontested that Plaintiff’s complaint involves a real property claim. Those claims includethe claims for quiet title, constructive trust, and fraudulent conveyance. Probable Validity of Plaintiff’s ClaimsNext, the Court considers the merits of the claim. “‘ “If the claimant does plead a real property claim,but the claim pleaded has no evidentiary merit, the lis pendens must be expunged upon motionunder [Code of Civil Procedure §] 405.32.” ’ [Citation.]” (La Jolla Group II v. Bruce (2012) 211Cal.App.4th 461, 475; see also Amalgamated Bank v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1003,1011-1012.) Under section 405.32, “the court shall order that the notice be expunged if the courtfinds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validityof the real property claim.” “Probable validity” means “it is more likely than not that the [plaintiff] willobtain a judgment against the defendant on the claim.” (Code of Civil Procedure §405.3.) Plaintiffa*gain has the burden on this issue and must present evidence showing it is likely to prevail on the realproperty claim. Defendant’s PositionDefendant argues that she is a bona fide purchaser for value of the Property. “A bona fide purchaserfor value “is one who pays value for the property without notice of any adverse interest or of anyirregularity in the sale proceedings.” (Melendrez v. D & I Investments, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th1238, 1250 quoting Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 442.) “The elements of bona fidepurchase are payment of value, in good faith, and without actual or constructive notice of another’srights.” (Id. at 1251 citations omitted.) “Thus, the two elements of being a BFP are that the buyer (1)purchase the property in good faith for value, and (2) have no knowledge or notice of asserted rightsof another.” (Ibid.)“The first element does not require that the buyer’s consideration be the fair market value of theproperty (or anything approaching it.) [citation] Instead, the buyer need only part with something ofvalue in exchange for the property.” (Ibid.) “The second element required to establish BFP status isthat the buyer have neither knowledge nor notice of the competing claim.” (Ibid.)Defendant presents evidence that the recorded grant deeds for the Property showing title transferredto Joseph Nacelli on July 1, 2009, and then from Mr. Nacelli to Defendant Tina Paclebar on December17, 2021. (Brink Decl. Exs. A-B.) There are no other recorded documents showing any other ownershipinterest in the Property by any other person, including Plaintiffs. In addition, when DefendantPaclebar purchased the Property Mr. Nacelli executed the purchase agreement as well as aHomeowner’s Policy of Title Insurance Affidavit. (Paclebar Decl. Exs. A-B.) By executing thesedocuments, Mr. Nacelli warranted that he was the owner of the Property and was unaware of any SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024liens or encumbrances on the Property.Defendant Paclebar also submits a declaration which states that, prior to the close of escrow, she“was never informed either verbally or in writing, that Joseph Nacelli did not have authority to sell methe Property, or that there was a verbal agreement between Joseph Nacelli and Plaintiffs concerningownership of the Property.” (Paclebar Decl. ¶ 10.)Thus, Defendant argues, that as the recorded documents only showed the Mr. Nacelli owned theProperty, Mr. Nacelli indicated in multiple documents that he was the owner, and Mrs. Paclebarclaims that she was never informed of any claims of ownership of the Property by Plaintiffs, she is abona fide purchaser for value. Plaintiffs’ PositionPlaintiffs dispute the claim that Ms. Paclebar had no knowledge of the arrangement they had withMr. Nacelli regarding their true ownership of the Property and the fact that Mr. Nacelli was merelyholding title on their behalf. They present evidence that Mr. Nacelli confirms that he was merelyholding title in their name, and that he never paid any money for the Property and had no realconnection to the Property. Mr. Nacelli testified as much: Q. So you never paid a cent for the Mariposa property; is that accurate? A. Yes. Q. And you never lived there; is that correct? A. Yes, that’s correct. Q. And you never received any income from the property; is that correct? A. Yes, that’s correct. Q. You merely put your name on the title for the plaintiffs; is that correct? A. Yes, that’s correct. … (Nacelli Depo. at 42:13-23.)Thus, Mr. Nacelli was aware that when he put the Property into his name, he was not doing so as the‘real’ or equitable owner, but was only the named or ‘paper’ title owner holding the Property onbehalf of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs acknowledge that Mr. Nacelli asserts that Plaintiffs breached the aboveagreement – apparently by allowing the Property to go into foreclosure on two occasions. (NacelliDepo. 42:21-48:4.) There were discussions between the parties during this time, and Plaintiffseventually fixed the foreclosure issues. (Ibid.) Since Plaintiffs addressed the issues, and ultimatelystarted making all necessary payments on the Property again, Mr. Nacelli confirmed he wascontinuing to hold title to the Property on behalf of Plaintiffs: Q. And then because they fixed [the foreclosure issues], you continued to hold title in your name but for [Plaintiffs] Josephine and Arnel; is that correct? A. Yes. (Nacelli Depo at 48:5-8.)Plaintiffs also dispute the claim that Ms. Paclebar had no knowledge of the above agreement, or the SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024fact that Plaintiffs were the owners-in-fact of the Property. While not technically a part of the family,Plaintiffs explain that Ms. Paclebar has been treated as such for over 15 years. She has been the long-term partner of Jane Nacelli – the sister of Joseph Nacelli and Plaintiff Josephine Agapito. (ArnelAgapito Decl. ¶ 2.) She has visited Plaintiffs’ house on numerous holidays over the years. (Id. ¶ 14.)Plaintiffs make clear that during these get togethers, both Plaintiffs specifically told Ms. Paclebar thatthey owned the Property. (Ibid.) Specifically, Arnel Agapito’s declaration states: “During these familyget-togethers, on more than one occasion, my wife and I told Defendant Tina Nacelli that we ownedthe Mariposa Property.” (Agapito Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendant’s ReplyOn Reply, Defendant refutes a number of the key statements in Mr. Agapito’s declaration – by citingto Mr. Agapito’s own deposition testimony. First, Defendant disputes the claim that Mr. Agapito hadan agreement (or personally knew about and agreement) with Mr. Nacelli wherein he would benamed the owner of the Property but would hold title for the benefit of Plaintiffs. Second, Defendantchallenges the claim that Mr. Agapito told Defendant Paclebar about this alleged agreement.Specifically, with regard to supposed agreement between Plaintiffs and Mr. Nacelli, Mr. Agapitotestified at his deposition as follows: Q. We touched on this earlier, but you personally never had a verbal agreement with Joseph [Nacelli] regarding him being on title to the Mariposa property to be held in trust for you or your wife; true? A. True. Q. If there was such a conversation, it was between your wife and Joseph; right? A. If -- if there was, it would be between Joseph and my wife. Yeah. (Agapito Depo. at 36:25-37:8.)Defendant contends the above testimony undermines the statements in the Agapito Declarationwhich state that Mr. and Mrs. Agapito had conversations with Mr. Nacelli regarding the arrangementand that Mr. Agapito has direct knowledge of the agreement. (See Agapito Decl. ¶¶ 4-7.)Defendant also takes issue with the declaration’s statement that “my wife and I told Defendant TinaNacelli (sic) that we owned the Mariposa Property.” (Agapito Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendant points out thatMr. Agapito’s deposition testimony is just the opposite: Q. Did you ever personally ever tell Tina that your wife and Joseph had reached a verbal agreement concerning the Mariposa property? A. No. … Q. Right. My question is a little more to the point. How do you know what Tina knows regarding any agreement between Joseph and your wife regarding any agreement between Joseph and your wife regarding the Mariposa property? How do you know SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 that? A. I don’t know. Q. You don’t know; right? A. I don’t know. I’m just speculating. (Agapito Depo. at 39:24-40:2; 68:1-7.)More specifically, Mr. Agapito testified at deposition that he “never had any conversation to -- to Tinaregarding the property.” (Id. at 79:13-21.)Thus, Mr. Agapito testified at deposition that (1) he never had an agreement with Mr. Nacelli, (2) hecan only speculate that Mrs. Agapito had an agreement with Mr. Nacelli, and (3) he never spoke toMrs. Paclebar regarding that alleged agreement.Defendant also submits deposition testimony from Mr. Nacelli confirming that he never toldDefendant Paclebar that he was not the true owner of the Property. (Nacelli Depo. at 31:22-32:15.)Essentially, on reply Defendant refutes any argument that she had any actual notice of the allegeagreement between Plaintiffs and Mr. Nacelli regarding title to the Property.AnalysisAs noted above, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges real property claims. Thus, thefocus of the Court’s inquiry relates to whether Plaintiffs has established by a preponderance of theevidence the probable validity of the real property claim. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 405.32.)It is undisputed that the recorded chain of title for the Property indicates that Mr. Nacelli was theowner of the Property from July 1, 2009 until December 17, 2021, when title was transferred toDefendant Paclebar. Plaintiffs’ general theory of their case is that Mr. Nacelli was holding theProperty in trust for them, and that Defendant Paclebar knew this to be the case. They allege anumber of different causes of action which all rely upon this general theory.Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Mr. Nacelli did not actually own the Property, but was merelyholding title in his name for the benefit of Plaintiffs. In fact, Mr. Nacelli admitted as much during hisdeposition. While Mr. Nacelli testified that he ‘believed’ that Plaintiffs’ breached their agreement – healso testified that they fixed any breach by remedying the foreclosure proceedings and continuing tomake payments on the mortgage. (Nacelli Depo at 48:5-8, quoted above.) Even if there were sometime limit discussed as to when Plaintiffs would transfer title into their name, there is no explanationas to why any breach of that term would result in actual title of the Property being conveyed to Mr.Nacelli.While Defendant cites to the representations made by Mr. Nacelli in, for example, the Homeowner’sPolicy of Title Insurance Affidavit that he was the true ‘owner’ of the Property, Plaintiffs allege fraudand breach of fiduciary duty causes of action against Mr. Nacelli that address these representations.Mr. Nacelli’s own testimony appears to undermine his representations made in these documents.While this evidence supports their claims against Mr. Nacelli, the main focus of the instant motion SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024relates to what Defendant Paclebar was aware of – or should have been aware of.Plaintiffs evidence regarding Defendant Paclebar’s knowledge of the agreement between Plaintiffsand Mr. Nacelli appeared convincing on first blush. Plaintiffs show that Defendant Paclebar is not adistant third-party to parties to this litigation. While she is not legally a member of the family, she hasbeen the long-term partner of the sister of the two main parties to the agreement – i.e. Plaintiff Mrs.Agapito and Defendant Nacelli. She has attended numerous family holidays over the years. Mr.Agapito, in his declaration in support of the opposition, affirmatively states that “my wife and I toldDefendant Tina Nacelli (sic) that we owned the Mariposa Property,” during these family events.That statement, however, turns out to be false. As outlined above, Mr. Agapito testified in hisdeposition that (1) he personally did not have an agreement with Mr. Nacelli regarding taking title tothe Property for the benefit of Plaintiffs, (2) he had no personal knowledge about any such agreementbetween his wife and Mr. Nacelli, and (3) he never personally told Defendant Paclebar that such anagreement existed. The statements in Mr. Agapito’s declaration were the sole basis for evidencingthat Ms. Paclebar had knowledge of the alleged agreement between Plaintiffs and Mr. Nacelli. “But adeclaration may not contradict factual admissions made in a deposition.” (Arnold v. Dignity Health(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412, 419 fn. 4 citations omitted.)As courts have made clear, in the context of summary judgment motions, a “party cannot evadesummary judgment by submitted a declaration contradicting his own prior deposition testimony.”(Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1120 citations omitted; see also Best RestMotel, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 969, 708-09, citing Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th482, 500, fn. 12 [“A party cannot create a triable issue of fact by providing a declaration thatcontradicts its prior deposition testimony.”]) The rationale behind this rule applies in the currentsituation.It is notable that Plaintiffs failed to submit a declaration by Mrs. Agapito – who Mr. Agapito indicateswas the party that allegedly had conversations with Mr. Nacelli and Mrs. Paclebar regarding theProperty. Instead, they attempt to have Mr. Agapito’s declaration evidence Mrs. Agapito’sknowledge. It is clear from Mr. Agapito’s deposition testimony, however, that he does not havepersonal knowledge of any agreement with Mr. Nacelli, nor of any discussions with Ms. Paclebarregarding this alleged agreement.“A bona fide purchaser for value “is one who pays value for the property without notice of anyadverse interest or of any irregularity in the sale proceedings.” (Melendrez, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at1250.) Plaintiffs have failed to provide any admissible and credible evidence showing that Mrs.Paclebar had any knowledge of the alleged agreement between Mr. Nacelli and Mrs. Agapitoregarding the Property.As for paying value, Plaintiffs concede that the Property was sold for $365,000, and that Ms. Paclebarpaid approximately $211,000 after the gift from Mr. Nacelli of roughly $154,000. They contend,without evidence, that this is ‘below market.’ Even if that is the case, a bone fide purchaser “need SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024only part with something of value in exchange for the property,” and that amount need not “be thefair market value of the property (or anything approaching it.)” (Melendrez, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at1251.)Under section 405.32, “the court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that theclaimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the realproperty claim.” “Probable validity” means “it is more likely than not that the [plaintiff] will obtain ajudgment against the defendant on the claim.” (Code of Civil Procedure §405.3.)Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden. As such,Defendant Paclebar’s motion to expunge the lis pendens is granted.Attorney FeesCalifornia Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38 provides: The court shall direct that the party prevailing on [a motion to expunge a lis pendens] be awarded the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of attorney’s fees and costs unjust.Plaintiff contends that their recording of the lis pendens was not frivolous and as such attorney’s feesand costs should be denied, citing a couple of unpublished federal district opinions. (Opp. at 12:25-13:4.) Such decisions are “neither binding nor controlling on matters of state law.” (T.H. v. NovartisPharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 175.)Plaintiffs have made no showing that they ‘acted with substantial justification.’ Instead, it appears tobe quite the opposite. Plaintiffs’ opposition relies upon statements in Mr. Agapito’s supportingdeclaration, made under penalty of perjury, which are directly contradicted by his earlier depositiontestimony. They fail to provide any admissible evidence showing that Ms. Paclebar had knowledge ofthe alleged agreement between Mrs. Agapito and Mr. Nacelli.Based on the above, the Court finds that attorney fees are properly awarded to Defendant in theamount of $4,675.

Ruling

THOMAS W. MCALLISTER, CO-TRUSTEES OF THE MCALLISTER FAMILY TRUST DATED 3/6/90, ET AL. VS HMFC RESTRAURANT GROUP, LLC, ET AL.

Jul 26, 2024 |6/18/2022 |23SMCV06028

Case Number: 23SMCV06028 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: I The court is inclined to GRANT the ex parte application assuming that there is no indicated opposition to it. The court continued the prior hearing and instructed counsel to inform opposing counsel of the continuance and to inform the court as to whether there is any opposition to the application, which is based on a settlement. No written opposition has been filed. If there is no indication of an oral opposition, the court will sign a judgment. However, the proposed judgment suggests that it is being rendered after trial. The court is not sure such is the case.

Ruling

JENNY SILVA-ROLAND ET AL VS. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK ET AL

Jul 23, 2024 |CGC23607732

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 23, 2024 line 2. DEFENDANT BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK , AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF CWHEQ REVOLVING HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST, SERIES 2007-A, SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, LLC DEMURRER TO 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT is continued to September 13, 2024. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Ruling

KURT GRIMES VS. RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC ET AL

Jul 25, 2024 |CGC23609026

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 25, 2024 line 3. DEFENDANT U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, BUT SOLELEY AS TRUSTEE OF CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2018-B, RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT DEMURRER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT. SUSTAINED. The Court notes that Plaintiff's opposition brief is again oversized. This is the last time the Court will review any filings by the Plaintiff's or Plaintiff's counsel that violate procedural requirements. The Court further notes that this oversized opposition again fails to address or recognize multiple arguments and authorities raised in the moving papers. The Court striking Plaintiff's oversized opposition on March 12, 2024 did not result in Plaintiff complying with the rules or addressing the demurrer on the merits. The Court orders Plaintiff's counsel to prepare and present hard copies for execution at the hearing: (1) an Order reflecting the Court's ruling of March 12, 2024; and (2) an order reflecting the Court's ruling on this demurrer. Plaintiff is ordered to serve copies of these orders to the California State Bar forthwith and file a declaration of service with the Court no later than August 1, 2024. Demurrer to causes of action for Violation of CC 2923.6(c); Violation of 2923.7 and Violation of 2924.10 is sustained without leave to amend. CC 2920.5(c)(2)(C). Demurrer to the cause of action for violation of CC 2923.5 is sustained with final leave to amend for Plaintiff to allege an actionable claim arising out of failure to comply with CC 2923.5 in conjunction with the recordation of June 16, 2022 NOD on September 20, 2022. Plaintiff must clearly set forth a legally available remedy sought for such violation within the body of this cause of action. Demurrer to the cause of action for violation of CC2924.9 is sustained with leave to amend for Plaintiff to allege an actionable violation of CC 2924.9 in light of Foote v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Plaintiff must clearly set forth a legally available remedy sought for such violation within the body of this cause of action. Demurrer to the cause of action for negligence is sustained without leave to amend. Plaintiff fails to cite any valid authority to support this cause of action and fails to address Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 948. Demurrer to the causes of action for UCL violation and cancellation of instruments is sustained with leave to amend for Plaintiff to allege facts in support of each element of these causes of action. Defendant's request for judicial Notice is granted. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Ruling

MARSHALL vs SKYLINE DEVELOPMENT CO LLC

Jul 23, 2024 |PSC1901112

Marshal v. SkylinePSC1901112 Hearing on Motion to Tax CostsDevelopment Co LLCTentative Ruling:This is a derivative action brought by certain homeowners in a planned community located inPalm Springs, California. On February 13, 2019, Plaintiffs Gemma Marshall, Lynn Leskera, MarkMatthews, Lori Matthews, Sandy Kaufman 4, and Dave Davidson, derivatively on behalf ofPinnacle Owners Association, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed their original “Member DerivativeComplaint” against Defendant Skyline Development Co. LLC (“Skyline”) for: (1) breach ofgoverning documents and (2) breach of fiduciary duty. After multiple demurrers and motions, onJanuary 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) againstDefendants Skyline Development Co., LLC, Jennifer Roberts, and David Gilbert (together3That motion was originally scheduled to be heard on July 10, 2024, but pursuant to an ex parte request by Plaintiffthe matter was continued and is set to be heard on September 18, 2024.4At some point, Lawrence Lichter was substituted in as trustee of the Sanford Kaufman Living Trust.“Defendants”). The TAC asserts causes of action for: (1) breach of governing documents andviolation of the Davis-Stirling Act (I); (2) breach of governing documents and violation of the Davis-Stirling Act (II); (3) breach of fiduciary duty of board director; (4) breach of fiduciary duty ofcontrolling shareholder; and (5) breach of fiduciary duty (supplemental). Thereafter, a demurrerto the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action was sustained.On April 10, 2024, the parties attended a Mandatory Settlement Conference (“MSC”) with JudgeTam Nomoto Schumann (Ret.). At the MSC, the parties entered into a settlement agreement thatwas conditioned on the signing of a formal written agreement, pursuant to which, among otherthings, the parties would be responsible for their own costs. Following the MSC, the partiesexchanged drafts of a written agreement, but due to the introduction of additional terms, thesettlement fell apart.On April 15, 2024, Lichter filed a request for dismissal of his claims against Defendants, and thedismissal was entered the same day. On April 24, 2024, Defendants filed a memorandum of costsseeking the recovery of $14,536.20.***Lichter moves to strike the costs sought by Defendants. He argues that the parties reached asettlement agreement at the MSC, under which the parties would bear their own fees and costs.He relied on this agreement in dismissing his claims, and Defendants are acting in bad faith byseeking to recover costs. He also argues that Plaintiffs are the ones who realized their litigationgoals in the settlement, so they should be deemed the prevailing party. Finally, he argues thatcosts should not be awarded against him because it is a derivative action and his claims are thesame as those brought by the other Plaintiffs.In opposition, Defendants argue that at the MSC (which Lichter did not attend in violation of acourt order 5), the parties reached a conditional settlement that would become final onceformalized in writing. They argue that the written agreement never happened, so there is nosettlement. Despite this, Lichter voluntarily dismissed his complaint as to all Defendants, makingthem the prevailing party. Finally, they argue that Lichter does not dispute the appropriateness ofany of the costs sought, so the motion should be denied entirely.In reply, Lichter argues that Defendants are not the prevailing parties and it would be inequitableto award costs against him.AnalysisUnder C.C.P. §1032(b), unless otherwise provided, “a prevailing party is entitled as a matter ofright to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” C.C.P. §1032(a)(4) defines prevailing party as:(1) party with a net monetary recovery; (2) a defendant who is dismissed; (3) a defendant whereneither plaintiff nor defendant recovers anything; and (4) a defendant as against those plaintiffswho do not recover any relief against that defendant. (Ibid.) “If any party recovers other thanmonetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the “prevailing party” shall be asdetermined by the court, and under those circ*mstances, the court, in its discretion, may allowcosts or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adversesides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.” (Ibid.)The court has no discretion in awarding fees if the moving party falls into one of the four categoriesset forth in C.C.P. § 1032(a)(4). (Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198; see also,Vons Cos., Inc. v. Lyle Parks Jr., Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 823, 832 [“absent statutory authority,‘the court has no discretion to deny costs to the prevailing party’”][citation omitted].) Additionally,when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a complaint, the defendant is the prevailing party. (Santisas5Lichter was, however, represented by counsel at the MSC.v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606.) “This is true … regardless of whether the dismissal is withor without prejudice.” (Cano v. Glover (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 326, 331.)In the present case, Lichter dismissed the action against Defendants. While he claims the partiesagreed that each party would bear their own costs, any such agreement was never formalized. 6Accordingly, Defendants are the prevailing parties as to Lichter and are entitled to their costs.Defendants seek to recover costs totaling $14,536.20.C.C.P. § 1033.5(a) contains a list of items specifically allowed as recoverable costs, and §1033.5(b) contains a list of items that “are not allowable as costs, except when expresslyauthorized by law.” An item neither specifically allowable under subdivision (a) nor prohibitedunder subdivision (b) may be allowed or denied in the discretion of the court if certainrequirements are satisfied. (C.C.P. § 1033.5(c)(4).) In particular, the item “shall be reasonablynecessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to itspreparation” and “shall be reasonable in amount.” (C.C.P. § 1033.5(c)(2) and (3).) Objection toany item or items on the cost memorandum may be made by filing and serving a noticed motionto tax cost. (C.C.P. § 1034; CRC 3.1700 (b)(1).)If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seekingto tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California StateAutomotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.) “A verified memorandum of costs isprima facie evidence of their propriety,” and the opposing party has the burden to demonstratethat they are not proper. (Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266.) A verifiedmemorandum does not require copies of bills, invoices or other documentation to be attached.(Id. at 1267.) If the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof ison the party claiming them as costs. (Ladas, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at 774.)Here, Defendants filed a verified memorandum of costs. The costs sought (for filing and motionfees, deposition costs, service of process, court reporter fees, and a discovery referee) appear tobe proper charges, and Lichter has not challenged any specific cost. Accordingly, Defendants areawarded costs totaling $14,536.20.Ruling:Deny the motion. Award costs to Defendants in the amount of $14,536.20 to be paid by Lichter.6If Lichter contends the dismissal was erroneously filed, he can seek to vacate the dismissal.

Ruling

FLORIDALMA AGUSTIN, ET AL. VS GARY GILLMAN, AS TRUSTEE OF THE GILLMAN FAMILY TRUST, ET AL.

Jul 29, 2024 |23STCV11783

Case Number: 23STCV11783 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT FLORIDALMA AGUSTIN, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. GARY GILLMAN, et al., Defendants. CASE NO.: 23STCV11783 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PETITIONS FOR APPROVAL OF COMPROMISE OF CLAIM OR ACTION OF DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDS OF JUDGMENT FOR MINOR Date: July 29, 2024 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Floridalma Agustin (Petitioner) The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition papers were filed. Any opposition papers were required to have been filed and served at least nine court days before the hearing under California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 1005, subdivision (b). BACKGROUND Petitioner, individually and as guardian ad litem for minor claimants Kayro Jehiel Carranza-Agustin (10); Loida Jocabed Carranza (8); and Elimelec Aliel Carranza-Agustin (4) (collectively, Minor Claimants), and Plaintiff Hugo Adolfo Carranza (collectively Plaintiffs), initiated this action against Defendants Gary Gillman; Debbie Gillman; and Encino Management Services (collectively, Defendants). This action arises out of a landlord/tenant relationship. The complaint alleges: (1) breach of warranty of habitability; (2) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (3) negligence; and (4) breach of contract. Petitioner filed the instant petitions to approve the compromise of disputed claim on behalf of Minor Claimants (collectively, the Petitions). DISCUSSION If an action is pending and settlement is effected prior to trial, the minors compromise must be approved by the court. (CCP § 372.) A petition to approve a minors compromise is governed by California Rules of Court (CRC), rules 7.950, et seq. and Probate Code sections 3500 and 3600 et seq. The trial court is authorized to approve and allow payment of reasonable expenses, costs, and attorney fees in an action concerning the compromise of a minors claim. (Prob. Code, § 3601, subd. (a); Curtis v. Estate of fa*gan (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 270, 277-79; see also CCP § 373.5.) Attorneys Fees Unless the court has approved the fee agreement in advance, the court must use a reasonable fee standard when approving and allowing the amount of attorney's fees payable from money or property paid or to be paid for the benefit of a minor or a person with a disability. (CRC, r. 7.955(a).) The court must give consideration to the terms of the agreement between the attorney and minors representative and must evaluate the agreement based on the facts and circ*mstances existing at the time the agreement was made. (CRC, r. 7.955(a)(2).) CRC Rule 7.955(b)(2) sets out nonexclusive factors the court may consider in determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees in connection with a petition for minors compromise. Under CRC Rule 7.955(c), the petition must include a declaration by the attorney addressing the factors set forth in CRC Rule 7.955(b)(2) that are applicable to the matter that is before the Court. Here, the Minor Claimants, by and through Petitioner, their guardian ad litem, have agreed to settle their claims against Defendants in exchange for $5,000 each. Upon approval, $1,250 of each settlement payment will be allocated towards attorneys fees, and $725.61 will be used to reimburse the fees and costs advanced by Plaintiffs' counsel, leaving a balance of $3,024.39 to be disbursed to Petitioner for each minor claimant. The Court finds that the settlement is fair and reasonable. Further, the Court considers the requested amount in attorneys fees, which amounts to 25% of each settlement payment, to be fair and reasonable. For these reasons and because they are unopposed, the Court provisionally GRANTS the Petitions, conditioned on Petitioner appearing (either remotely or in person) at the hearing. (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 29th day of July 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

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Jul 28, 2024 |CV-22-003529

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